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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
1 U'hOF I I Ml 
I l . i i i i i i f l A p p e l l e e , 
v. 
FELIX G. FERNANDEZ, 
Defendant/" Appe 11 an t. 
CaseNo.20010913-CA 
BR IEF OF A PPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
**
n
* appeals his conviction of damaging a jail, a third degree felon1, in 
violation v9), in the Seventh Judicial District Court, 
San Juan County, the Honoiai in piesuliii|L? 1 Ins Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
I S S U E p R E S E N T E D Q N A p p E A L A N p STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Was the t. leienodrtt s trial appropnate given that 
defendant was incarcerated, had threatened .• * it given an 
opportunity? 
Standard of Vi1*|,,|ii1 "l|11 M ial coun ^ ruhng as to whether defendant received a fair 
trial is a mixed question of la;w mrl i-n-t " < M/m tl Cm lorreetness. State v Daniels, 2002 
UT 2, % 19, 40 P.3d 611. However, "the trial court's application of certain factual 
circumstances to the law regarding the right to a fair trial also merits a certain measure of 
discretion." Id. 
Issue No. 2: Has defendant shown prejudice as a result of the trial court's refusal 
to excuse for cause a prospective who was ultimately removed by a defense peremptory 
challenge? 
Standard of Review: "[A] trial court's determination of whether to excuse a 
prospective juror for cause should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 25, 24 P.3d 948. 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err in denying a mistrial after a jailer testified that 
defendant was in "punitive lock down" at the time he was accused of flooding the jail? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for a 
mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230-
31 (Utah 1997). 
Issue No. 4: Did the trial court err in refusing to order a presentence investigation 
report solely for the benefit of the Board of Pardons? 
Standard of Review: Defendant's claim that the trial court wrongly interpreted 
the governing statute presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Souza, 
846P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993). 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND R U U > 
:._;., levant to this appeal: 
Utah Code An - i r ^ ^ , mi 
A person who VMIIIUH; and liueriiiuiially breaks down, pulls down, 
destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of 
confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and co-defendant J - n ., it . adi iliarged vuth one count of 
damaging a jail by clogging a toilet (R. i). 
Before trial, the defendants moved to exclude any reference to the defendant's 
status as inm;* <- ... ^  ;nat the fact that the defendants were 
jail inmates accused of flooding their cei - could no- . . . , ; A 111 \ f>). 
However, the court prohibited any reference :o wh> ;:~ ~ 
: testimony concerning the fact that the defendants were in "lock-
down" v^ao ai chc umt - the incident l, I , 1 11 !'' j 
Defendant also objected to being shackled dun OH tn.il .111 11 Ilk1 meseiki nl iwo 
armed bailiffs (R * ......0- ?^  ^ V :_ - ' ruled that the shackles and bailiffs were needed 
because defer - usk and to ensure security in the courtroom (R 
3 
During jury selection, the defendants moved to exclude five jurors for cause (R. 
103:67). The court denied the motion and the defendants removed three of those jurors 
through peremptory challenges (id.). 
Jurors convicted defendant of damaging a jail (R. 103:245). Defendant was 
sentenced to zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 97). As required by law, the 
court ran the sentence consecutively to the term defendant was already serving (id.). He 
timely appeals (R. 97-99). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 17, 2001, defendant was incarcerated in the San Juan County Jail 
(R. 103:82). On that day, jailers determined that defendant and another inmate, Joseph 
Madsen, had possession of a jail Polaroid camera that had been missing for several weeks 
(R. 103:84-85). After the camera was confiscated, jailers searched defendant's cell and 
discovered several items of contraband - including drugs and a pair of safety scissors 
with a sharpened tip. These items, too, were confiscated (R. 103:89, 104-05). 
At that time, defendant threatened to harm one of the jailers (R. 103:89). From his 
cell, Madsen also made threats, including the threat to flood the top tier of the jail if he 
was not moved to a different cell (R. 103:91). 
During the search of defendant's cell, one jailer noted an electrical hazard and so 
moved defendant to a different cell (R. 103:91-92). Pursuant to standard procedure, the 
jailer inspected the new cell and determined that all the plumbing and electrical 
4 
equipment we r: n u orkine <.? ier uJ ; Specifically, he flushed 
worked prope 
M '»***- i . ... . sliced a "water fall" cascading down from the 
upper tiers vwiww Madsenanuur* en; IIMU<MII f»r™en IIKI 
defendant were the only inmates housed on that tier. After removing ihi IH< mii-iit -. 
limn ihen -tells, plumbers were summoned to unclog the toilets (R. 103:98). The 
plumbers retrieval , II'MIIM ' l MJ'«« ,1!" IHICIWI'JI inn Madsen s toilet fR 10? oq\ \ 
laundry bag was retrieved from defendant's toilet ( 
Defendant claimed someone else flushed the laundry bag down the toilet 
( k • 
SUMMA R I OF ARGUMEN I 
Point I: Because defendant was a jail inmate,, had "udi iliiviii1, 10 )J»ICIL i|hi WAS a 
fligh - it was appropriate for the trial court to require that defendant be shackled 
during the trial in 1 llial n\ ii il guards be positioned nearby. Because jurors knew 
defendant was an inmate, and because flu1 irial rourl lun -. • -ines lo ensure jurors could 
not see the shackles, defendant suffered no prejudice. 
I1 null II: I lefendant suffered no prejudice from the court's refusal to remove an 
allegedly biased fM ,,i,fin tn, r iin i 'v. in "h.i vwis ieinoveil through a peremptory 
challenge and detc ikes no claim on appeal that am, I ill" funi1. 
b i a s e d , • ' ' •. • • - ' 
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Point III: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's 
motion for a mistrial when a jailer inadvertently referred to defendant's status as a "lock-
down" inmate at the time of the flooding. Any reference to defendant's "lock-down" 
status was insignificant given that jurors already knew defendant was a jail inmate, that 
he had threatened jailers and that he was allowed out of his cell for only one hour a day. 
Thus, defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of the jailer's testimony. 
Point IV: Defendant is not entitled to a presentence report. Thus, the trial court's 
failure to order one was not erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO SHACKLE 
DEFENDANT AND POST TWO BAILIFFS IN THE 
COURTROOM PROPERLY ENSURED COURTROOM 
SECURITY WHILE MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL 
FOR PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT. 
Defendant argues that the trial court denied him his right to a fair trial by 
permitting him to be tried in shackles and by sanctioning the presence of two armed 
bailiffs in the courtroom during his trial. Br. Aplt. at 10. Specifically, defendant claims 
that shackling the Defendant and allowing armed uniformed law enforcement officers in 
the courtroom was prejudicial and eroded the presumption of innocence." Id. 
Defendant is correct that requiring a defendant to be tried in shackles or with other 
telltale signs that he is a jail or prison inmate has the potential to jeopardize the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) 
6 
(defendant fc"is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of 
the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of. . . other circumstances not 
adduced as proof at trial'") (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)). "[A] 
criminal defendant is generally entitled to the 'physical indicia of innocence' . . . [which] 
most often refers to the right of a criminal defendant to be tried in front of a jury in the 
'garb of innocence,' rather than in prison clothing." State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 
(Utah App. 1991) (citing Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 104, 105 (6th Cir.1973), 
cert, denied, Kennedy v. Gray, 416 U.S. 959 (1974)). For these reasons, shackles have 
been deemed "inherently prejudicial" because the presumption of innocence, "a 
component of [the] guarantee of the right to a fair trial and . . . a basic element of our 
criminal justice system" is put at risk. State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, f 20, 40 P.3d 611; 
accord State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah App. 1992). 
Nonetheless, "[t]he extent to which security measures are necessary to ensure a 
safe and orderly proceeding is within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will 
not overrule that exercise of discretion unless it was clearly abused." Lemons, 844 P.2d at 
379. Despite the inherent dangers of shackling a defendant in court, restraints are 
sometimes necessary when a defendant is a flight risk, has a history of violence or an 
erratic temperament. Mitchell, 824 P.2d at 473. Still, if a defendant requires restraint, the 
trial court should take measures to ensure that the restraints are not apparent to jurors. 
See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993) (trial court's efforts to minimize the effect 
7 
of defendant's shackles by placing them beneath defendant's clothing likely prevented 
prejudice). 
Here, the shackling of defendant did not prejudice his right to a fair trial. Before 
his trial began, the trial court addressed the concerns raised by defense counsel that 
defendant and his co-defendant were to be shackled (R. 103:12). Because defendant had 
previously told a jailer that he would attempt to flee if given the opportunity, and because 
his co-defendant had been in several fights in jail, the trial court determined that shackles 
were necessary (R. 103:8-12). However, jail staff provided a barrier around the table 
where defendant sat so that jurors could not see the shackles (R. 103:7). Thus, after 
considering defendant's concerns, the trial court observed: "I can't see them. I can't see 
why the jury would be able to see 'em and so the prejudice is virtually nonexistent" (R. 
103:12). 
On appeal, defendant does not even claim that any juror ever viewed him or his co-
defendant in shackles. This alone is fatal to defendant's claim. But even if jurors had 
glimpsed defendant's restraints during the trial, this would not necessarily '"dilute the 
presumption of innocence.'" See State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 80 (Utah 1993) (citing 
United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 75, 83 (1st Cir.1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1030 
(1987)). Because the crime occurred within the jail, jurors would inevitably learn that 
defendant was an inmate. Thus, it would not surprise jurors if they had happened to 
glimpse the shackles. 
8 
Defendant also claims that the presence of two uniformed bailiffs, one of whom 
apparently sat directly behind the defendant, violated his constitutional rights (R. 103:66-
67). However, the presence of uniformed bailiffs or guards, unlike shackling the 
defendant, is not considered to be inherently prejudicial. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569. In 
Holbrook, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the presence of guards is less prejudicial 
than the appearance of defendant in shackles or prison clothing because of "the wider 
range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the officers' presence." Id. at 
569. Possible inferences listed by the Holbrook court were: "(1) jurors may believe that 
the officers were present to handle potential disturbances outside the courtroom or (2) to 
ensure tense courtroom exchanges did not erupt into violence; (3) security officers may 
be perceived simply as 'elements of an impressive drama'; or (4) jurors may not infer 
anything at all." Id. 
In this case, it is implausible to suggest that the presence of two armed bailiffs in a 
courtroom in which two defendants are on trial constitutes "excessive courtroom 
security." Br. Aplt. at 7. Indeed, in Holbrook, a police officer testified that the "preferred 
ratio" in that state's courts was two officers to each defendant. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 
564; see also State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 279-80 (Utah 1989) (presence of four 
security guards not prejudicial). Moreover, courtrooms always have at least one armed, 
uniformed bailiff. Thus, defendant's claim that the presence of one additional bailiff at 
his trial was excessive is without merit. 
9 
Moreover, and contrary to defendant's claim, placing a second bailiff behind the 
defense counsel table did not undermine defendant's presumption of innocence. In 
Gardner, two of the four armed guards sat directly behind the defendant without creating 
undue prejudice. Gardner, 789 P.2d 279-80. Moreover, as in Holbrook, the placement 
of the officer behind the defendants was subject to various interpretations. Because two 
inmates were on trial together, the presence of a second bailiff was probably barely 
noticed by the jury. Jurors might also reasonably surmise, given that defendants were 
charged with stealing a camera and flooding a jail, that the defendants were mischief-
makers who required constant monitoring. In any event, the facts fall well short of 
establishing inherent prejudice. 
II. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT HE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO REMOVE AN ALLEGEDLY BIASED 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WHO ULTIMATELY DID 
NOT SIT ON THE JURY. 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error in not removing 
for cause jurors who were then removed through peremptory challenges. Defendant's 
claim fails because he has not demonstrated that any of the jurors who ultimately sat on 
the jury were biased. 
It is well-settled that "'[s]o long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the 
defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the 
[Constitution] was violated." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). To show 
10 
prejudice, defendant must show not only that he was forced to use a peremptory challenge 
to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause, but also that the use of the 
peremptory challenge made it impossible to remove another biased juror who was 
ultimately seated. Wach, 2001 UT at f 36. Defendant has not met this burden. 
The trial court ultimately approved sixteen prospective jurors and allowed each 
side four peremptory challenges to come up with an eight-member jury (R. 103:67). Of 
the five jurors defendants challenged for cause, three were removed through peremptory 
challenges. Defendant appears to have exercised his fourth peremptory challenge to 
remove Kenneth Black, a prospective juror whose impartiality was never questioned in 
the course of voir dire. See R. 94, 103:67. Thus, only two of the five challenged jurors -
Daniel Brandt and Dennis Anderson - actually sat on the jury (id.). Accordingly, to 
demonstrate prejudice, defendant would have to show that both Brandt and Anderson 
were biased and should have been removed for cause and that he could not remove them 
because he exhausted all his peremptory challenges to remove other biased jurors. Wach, 
2001 UT at U 36. On appeal, however, defendant does not even mention Brandt and 
Anderson, let alone claim they were biased. Instead, defendant simply focuses his 
analysis on Jones, whose alleged biases could not have prejudiced defendant because 
Jones was removed by defendant's peremptory challenge.1 Wach, 2001 UT at f 36; 
1
 Defendant also mentions, but does not discuss, prospective juror Loretta 
Bradford, whose impartiality was questioned because her son is a police officer in 
Blanding (R. 103:35, 67). However, Bradford was also removed through a peremptory 
11 
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398. Defendant therefore has abandoned any claim he may have 
made below that Brandt and Anderson should have been removed for cause. 
Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice from the court's denial of his 
for-cause challenges. 
Finally, defendant cites State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, to suggest 
that reversal is required simply because the trial court failed to remove Jones for cause. 
Br. Aplt. at 14. This point lacks proper analysis and should be rejected for that reason 
alone. See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, | 8,47 P.3d 107 (pursuant to rule 24, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[i]t is well established that a reviewing court will not 
address arguments that are not adequately briefed") (quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (appellate court 
need not consider arguments unsupported by case law or lacking proper analysis). 
In any event, Saunders does not support defendant's claim. The Saunders plurality 
held that a defendant may have met his burden of showing prejudice from the denial of 
challenges for cause when a trial court makes numerous errors during jury voir dire and 
those errors are "sufficiently cumulative to raise a reasonable question as to the neutrality 
of the jury and to constitute reversible error." Id. at f 55. As argued above, defendant has 
not demonstrated on appeal that any juror who sat was biased or that the trial court made 
any errors during voir dire. However, even assuming that the trial court should have 
ch jnge and did not sit on the jury (R. 103:67). 
12 
removed Jones for cause, a single erroneous ruling is not cumulative. See Wach, 2001 
UT at % 37, n.4 (single erroneous for-cause ruling is not cumulative). Accordingly, 
defendant's claims of juror bias and resulting prejudice are without merit. 
III. TESTIMONY CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S "LOCK-
DOWN" STATUS DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
Defendant claims the trial court's failure to declare a mistrial was an abuse of 
discretion requiring reversal. See Br. Aplt. at 15-16. This argument fails. 
Prior to trial, the court granted a defense motion in limine prohibiting the 
introduction of evidence concerning defendant's "lock-down" status at the time of the 
flooding (R. 103:15). Despite that ruling, a jail officer testified that both defendants were 
housed in "what we call lock down cells - punitive type isolation cells" (R. 103:171). 
Outside the presence of the jury, defendants moved for a mistrial and the trial judge 
scolded both the prosecutor and the jailer for violating his order (R. 103:174-75). The 
trial court considered granting the motion, not because he believed the defendants had 
been prejudiced, but rather "to make a point. . . to the prosecution . . . and witnesses" 
about paying closer attention to the court's rulings (R. 103:181-82). Ultimately, however, 
the court chose to deny the motion, stating: 
[T]he additional prejudice to these defendants from this 
coming out on top of everything else this jury's heard today is 
like tossing a - another, ah, shovel of manure in a great big 
cattle truck. I mean it just is minimal, in comparison with 
what [sic] the rest of the things that the jury's heard. 
13 
(Id. ax 182).: 
Defendant's argument that the trial abused its discretion in denying the motion for 
a mistrial fails because he has not demonstrated that the admission of the evidence "so 
likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial." State 
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997). A trial court's denial of a motion for a 
mistrial is subject to very limited review on appeal. Id. 
Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision 
is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the 
jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, 
we will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of 
discretion. We review such a decision with just deference 
because of the advantaged position of the trial judge to 
determine the impact of events occurring in the courtroom on 
the total proceedings 
Id. 
As the trial court correctly observed, the jury already had before it properly-
admitted evidence more damaging to defendant than the jailer's testimony that defendant 
was in punitive isolation. The jury knew defendant threatened to harm one of the jailers 
(R. 103:89). The jury knew that defendant was allowed out of his cell for only a single 
2
 The trial court also offered to give a curative jury instruction, which defendant 
refused (R. 103:187-90). While is it defendant's prerogative to refuse such an instruction 
for strategic reasons, he is not thus entitled to a new trial. See Smith v. United States, 665 
A.2d 962, 966 (D.C. App. 1995) ("[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion when 
prejudice can be cured by an instruction to the jury, and a corrective instruction is offered 
but declined"); see also State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah 1997)(declining to 
speculate as to effect of curative instruction where the instruction was offered but 
declined). 
14 
hour each day (R. 103:116). They knew that, although defendant was incarcerated in a 
county jail, he was actually a prisoner of the state, not the county (R. 103:119, 120). They 
also knew jailers had searched defendant's cell and confiscated several items of 
contraband - including drugs and a pair of safety scissors with a sharpened tip (R. 103:89, 
104-05). Given the abundance of properly-admitted evidence, the further knowledge of 
defendant's confinement in punitive isolation added little to the evidentiary picture 
already before the jury. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
IV. DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A PRE-
SENTENCE REPORT. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to order a presentence report, not 
because the report would have assisted in sentencing, but because the report would assist 
the Board of Pardons in setting a parole date.3 Br. Aplt. at 17. "There is no legitimate 
criteria by which trial court should be enrolled [sic] to decide what Defendants should or 
shouldn't receive pre-sentence reports." Br. Aplt. at 17. This argument is without merit. 
"[Sentencing procedures . . . are clearly discretionary with the trial court." State 
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978). A trial court exercises discretion "in 
determining what punishment fits both the crime and the offender." State v. Lipsky, 608 
3
 Defendant does not contend that the trial court's allegedly flawed statutory 
interpretation rendered his sentence in any way incorrect. Rather, he speculates that, at 
some unspecified future time, the lack of a presentence report will negatively impact a 
decision of the Board of Pardons. Br. Aplt. at 17. 
15 
P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980). The trial court can order a presentence investigation report, 
if defendant concurs in the necessary delay. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a). The 
resulting report is then subject to scrutiny and correction by the defendant. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a). Although the primary purpose of the presentence report is to 
provide reliable data for fashioning the sentence, the trial court is not bound by either the 
report's factual contents or its recommendations. State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 
(Utah 1982). 
Although defendant seems to suggest that the trial court should order a presentence 
investigation report in every case, he cites no authority for this proposition. See State v. 
Cramer, 2002 UT 9, f 24, 44 P.3d 690 (where defendant cites no persuasive authority for 
his claim, it fails). Nor would there be good reason for doing so in every case. For 
example, as the trial court noted in this case, where defendant was already incarcerated on 
another crime when he committed the present felony, a presentence investigation report 
would not serve any useful purpose. The court clearly could not consider probation. Cf. 
Scott v. Ryan, 548 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 1976) (bail unavailable to defendant accused of 
committing a felony while on probation or parole for a previous felony). Moreover, 
although defendant complains about the trial court's imposition of a sentence consecutive 
with the term he was already serving, consecutive sentences are required by law. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (sentences must be consecutive if later offense committed 
during imprisonment). Thus, the trial court had little choice but to impose the statutory 
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indeterminate sentence for the new crimes and leave the specific length of incarceration 
to the "unfettered discretion" of the Board of Pardons. Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 
P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). 
The foregoing demonstrates that a presentence report would have provided little if 
any assistance to the trial court. In any event, defendant did not request the report for that 
purpose. In fact, he only apparently wanted a report for the parole board to which his 
counsel would have easier access (R. 103:251). Br. Aplt. at 17. Accordingly, ordering 
the report was more the prerogative of the parole board than the trial court. Moreover, a 
report for the benefit of the parole board would be available to defendant and his counsel, 
along with the contents of his entire file, prior to his first parole hearing. Labrum v. Bd. 
of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah 1993). No authority suggests, much less mandates, 
that the trial court is bound to order reports for the eventual use of the parole board. 
In short, defendant's claim that the trial court erred in failing to order a 
presentence report is without basis in the law and should be rejected. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
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